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Abstract 
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) offer a popular 
means by which the public sector can obtain infor-
mation technology (IT) innovations and management 
know-how from private firms. However, these IT 
PPPs are extremely difficult to realize, especially 
considering the divergent interests of public- and pri-
vate-side stake-holders. Our case study of an IT PPP 
reveals public- and private-side differences that ini-
tially impeded the establishment of a partnership; 
using institutional logics theory as meta-theoretical 
lens, we propose a model that explains how public 
and private parties managed to negotiate their mode 
of collaboration by balancing their competing institu-
tional norms and practices which ultimately resulted 
in the convergence of the two divergent logics. Our 
paper contributes to theory and practice by (1) eluci-
dating the theoretical foundations and role of institu-
tional logics for IT project management that we found 
dominated by public and private norms and practices, 
(2) explaining why collaboration in IT PPPs is so diffi-
cult, and (3) how eventually an IT PPP can be estab-
lished. We discuss theoretical and practical implica-
tions in the paper. 
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Introduction 
Information technology (IT) public-private partner-
ships (PPPs) are long-term co-operative engage-
ments between public organizations and private IT 
companies to provide public services with higher 
quality at lower costs, while sharing resources, re-
sponsibilities, and objectives (Marschollek & Beck, 
2012; Maskin & Tirole, 2008). Such partnerships—
following the trend in the area of infrastructure con-
struction—have established themselves in practice to 
transfer operational risks to the private partner and to 
gain access to latest IT and IT-related technical or 
managerial services (Kwak, et al., 2009). Despite 
these obvious benefits and the prevailing trend of IT 
PPPs, agents have to deal with significant technolog-
ical complexity and uncertainty (Flyvbjerg & Budzier, 
2011). From IT project management literature we 
know that dealing with these challenges is extremely 
difficult and projects fail on a frequent basis (Nelson, 
2007). However, in public contexts, failure and project 
termination are not considered an option and long-
term partnerships are needed that pose different 
challenges than managing temporary organizations. 
It is generally acknowledged that establishing a long-
term IT partnership is extremely difficult. However, 
public and private partners in an IT PPP are even 
more ‘worlds apart’ than other kinds of IT partner-
ships because they span multiple organizational and 
cultural boundaries. Thus, due to the unique chal-
lenges and high practical relevance, we argue that 
more research is needed that examines the nature of 
these challenges and how they can be overcome. In 
particular, while challenges and managerial ap-
proaches have been examined in many related fields, 
including IT project management, business-IT align-
ment, and IT outsourcing, there is a significant gap in 
our understanding about IT PPPs. 
To address this, we conducted an interpretive explor-
atory case study of the German TollCollect IT PPP. 
TollCollect dealt with the development, implementa-
tion, and operation of a satellite-based system for 
collecting toll charges from heavy trucks that use the 
German highway system. Despite initial difficulties, 
the partnership eventually succeeded with the reali-
zation of the IT system. It has been in operation since 
January 1st, 2005 and generates more than 3 billion 
Euros in revenue annually for the Federal Republic of 
Germany.  
In the analysis process after we collected the data 
and did the coding, we identified institutional logics 
theory (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008) as appropriate lens 
for the interpretation and analysis of our case data. 
The reasoning behind this theoretical framing was 
that the main theme emerging from our case data 
was closely associated with regulative (e.g., laws), 
normative (e.g., shared norms), and cultural-cognitive 
(e.g., shared beliefs, logics of action) phenomena, 
which are part of the institutional environment of an 
organization (Scott, 2001). Social interactions within 
these organizations are guided by institutional logics, 
which provide the formal and informal rules for col-
laboration (Friedland & Alford, 1991).  
Prior research on institutional logics has focused on 
the interplay of competing institutional logics in or-
ganizational settings. While this competition can gen-
erate alternative outcomes such as a weak or strong 
dominance of one logic over the other, there are also 
situations reported in which both logics continue to 
coexist or in which both logics were replaced by a 
third one. However, based on what emerges from our 
data analysis, we are able to develop theoretical in-
sights about the convergence process in which com-
peting institutional logics are replaced by a new one.  
In the next sections, we introduce the theoretical 
background literature and explain our applied re-
search methodology. After a brief introduction to the 
case, we present our findings about IT PPP man-
agement in our case, discuss the theoretical and 
practical contributions of those findings and provide 
directions for further research.  
Theoretical Background: Institutional 
Logics 
Since the 1960s, PPP arrangements between public 
and private organizations became increasingly popu-
lar to combine the strengths of public (e.g., know-how 
on coping with legal requirements) and private organ-
izations (e.g., technological and business process 
know-how) instead of contracting out or even privat-
ize the provisioning of public services (Hodge & 
Greve, 2007). In order to realize synergies in such a 
partnership, a PPP needs to be characterized by trust, 
openness, fairness, and mutual respect (Pongsiri, 
2002), while pursuing the same goals (Scharle, 2002). 
While the technological challenges of public IT en-
deavors are very similar to the ones in other indus-
tries (Nelson, 2007), organizational challenges and 
tensions in public-private collaboration have been 
attributed to differences in institutional interests and 
practices (Reijniers, 1994). These institutional differ-
ences can cause ongoing misunderstandings and 
conflicts, which may prevent the establishment of a 
PPP (Jost, et al., 2005). Thus, prior PPP research 
underlines the necessity of investigating PPP goals 
and practices as important factors for successful co-
operation between the partners (van Marrewijk, 2007; 
van Marrewijk, et al., 2008).  
According to institutional logics theory, different or-
ganizational values, beliefs, and practices have been 
formed in response to legitimize the existence of dif-
ferent environments and processes (Scott, 2001). 
Based on these regulative, normative, and cultural-
cognitive differences, institutional logics provide the 
formal and informal framework that guides organiza-
tions in the application of values, beliefs, and practic-
es in their decision making (Thornton & Ocasio, 
1999). Institutional logics theory provides an ade-
quate lens to explore the embedded norms of public 
and private organizations, which each trigger different 
organizational practices and processes (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991; Scott, 1987). 
In the context of competing institutional logics, both 
management and organizational science research 
has investigated possible outcomes of the competi-
tion between institutional logics (compare Table 1). 
Reay and Hinings (2005), as well as Swan et al. 
(2010), argue that in the competition of two existing 
logics, inevitably one will always dominate the other. 
However, van Gestel and Hillebrand (2011) observe 
the coexistence of competing logics, even if one 
weakly dominates the other. Other studies indicate 
that competing logics may even coexist in the long 
term, without one logic replacing or undermining the 
other (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Dunn & Jones, 
2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Purdy & Gray, 2009; Reay & 
Hinings, 2009). Finally, two competing logics could 
also be replaced by a new dominant logic (Currie & 
Guah, 2007; Randall & Munro, 2010; Sahay, et al., 
2010). Table 1 summarizes these different possible 
outcomes of competing logics. 
Table 1. Classification of possible outcomes of competing institutional logics 
Process of competing 
logics
Outcome 
conceptualization
Process description Reference examples
strong dominance
Interplay between competing 
institutional logics and 
dominance of one of the 
competing logics
Reay & Hinings (2005); 
Swan et al. (2010)
weak dominance
Coexistence of competing 
institutional logics after 
settling of a dominant logic
van Gestel & Hillebrand (2011)
coexistence
Coexistence of competing 
institutional logics
Lounsbury (2007); 
Purdy & Gray (2009); 
Reay & Hinings (2009); 
Battilana & Dorado (2010); 
Dunn & Jones (2010)
replacement
Interplay between competing 
institutional logics and 
replacement by a new dominant 
institutional logic
Currie & Guah (2007); 
Randall & Munro (2010); 
Sahay et al. (2010)
A
B
A
to t1
A
B
A
B
to t1
A
B
A
B
to t1
A
B
C
to t1
 
Prior information systems (IS) research adopted insti-
tutional logics theory to examine in an intra-
organizational setting how competing institutional 
logics accelerate or inhibit the adoption and diffusion 
of a national IT program (Currie & Guah, 2007), or 
analyzed the interplay of competing logics, as well as 
their deinstitutionalization for IS implementation pro-
jects in the health care system (Sahay, et al., 2010). 
In summary, while prior research has focused on ex-
amining the antecedents (i.e., competition) and out-
comes (i.e., strong dominance, weak dominance, 
etc.) of multiple institutional logics at play, in this 
study we are able to provide first empirical insights 
into the link between antecedents and outcomes, i.e., 
the dynamic process of how the transition from com-
petition to convergence unfolds over time (thereby 
confirming and extending literature on replacement of 
institutional logics (Table 1)). In contrast to prior liter-
ature on inter-organizational logics (Currie & Guah, 
2007; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Reay & Hinings, 2009), 
our case study provides new explanations on the in-
terplay of competing institutional logics and the pro-
cess of establishing IT PPPs. 
 
Research Methodology 
We conducted an interpretive research study based 
on 12 expert interviews we have done between May 
2006 and June 2007. Each interview lasted between 
52 minutes and 3 hours and 45 minutes, using a 
semi-structured interview guideline with open-ended 
questions about partnership history, partnership de-
velopment, and partnership management. All inter-
views were recorded and transcribed, resulting in 
1,003 audio minutes and 246 pages of transcriptions. 
We used the software Atlas.ti (Muhr, 2008) to organ-
ize our data in a central database and for coding pur-
poses. Interviewing and data collection in general 
took the form of an iterative process of going back 
and forth between analyzing collected data and se-
lecting/collecting further data sources, a methodolog-
ical technique frequently recommended for case 
study research (Pan & Tan, 2011). To gain insights 
from different perspectives on the IT PPP, we not only 
selected the interviewees according to their role in 
the partnership, but also according to their position in 
the hierarchy and their affiliation with the participating 
parties. Sampling took the form of snow-ball sampling 
(Pan & Tan, 2011) in which each respondent is asked 
for other experts to interview. The affiliations and the 
corresponding interviews are detailed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Affiliation of interviewees and number of interviews 
Organizational Affiliation 
Hierarchy Level & 
Affiliation 
Number of Interviews 
Public side 
Federal Ministry of Transport (2), Federal Parlia-
ment (1), and independent system auditor for the 
public side (1) 
 
 Member of parliament  
 Federal ministry 
 Federal agency 
 System auditor 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Private side 
DaimlerChrysler AG (1),  
Deutsche Telekom AG (2),  
TollCollect GmbH (5) 
 
 Top management  
 Middle management 
 Project management  
 
3 
3 
2 
 
Following the interpretive research principles of Klein 
and Myers (1999) in our intertwined data collection 
and analysis process (referred to as principle #1 to 
#7 in the following), we iterated between the different 
phenomena that emerged in our TollCollect analysis 
and the interdependent meanings and relations of 
these phenomena, as illustrated in Table 3. For ex-
ample, we identified different public and private goals 
the stakeholders were aiming at as well as how these 
different goals unfolded in the steering of the TollCol-
lect project as a whole. In Table 4 we provide a cod-
ing example and illustrate the hermeneutic circle for 
the identified codes or phenomena, their meaning 
and how they are related towards an aggregate, 
more abstract category of institutional logic (principle 
#1). Building upon the identified phenomena, we paid 
attention to the sequence of events to delineate 
phases of partnership development (Langley, 1999; 
Mohr, 1982; van de Ven, 2007). As a basis for that we 
first created a detailed description of the relevant 
events and mapped them against a timeline by read-
ing the interview notes and transcripts multiple times 
which also helped us to provide a contextualized nar-
rative of the TollCollect case as illustrated in the fol-
lowing section (principle #2). 
In addition to sampling and triangulation of our prima-
ry data (i.e., comparing different interviewee and in-
terviewer perceptions), we collected extensive sec-
ondary material, such as meeting minutes and public 
media articles, for further triangulation. In so doing, 
we were able to critically reflect what we learned from 
the interaction with the interviewees in the light media 
coverage of the case to calibrate our own preconcep-
tions (principle #3). The collected 2,422 press articles 
helped us enhance our understanding of the IT PPP 
and its environment, as well as compare the insights 
on the partnership’s course of action from our 
seondary data with findings from the primary data 
(see appendix). 
In our analysis of the case, a core principle that we 
followed was the emergence and abstraction of find-
ings from the empirical data, while developing and 
considering multiple possible explanations (principles 
#4 and #5). For example, before we identified institu-
tional logics as suitable lens to explain the relational 
rules underlying the IT PPP case, we also considered 
psychological contract theory (Koh, et al., 2004) and 
boundary spanning theory (Levina & Vaast, 2005) as 
alternative lenses. The latter ones conceptualize 
norms and rules enacted on individual level which is 
the reason why we were looking for a theoretical lens 
that takes the organizational context and setting into 
account. 
This highly iterative process of ‘retroduction,’ (Peirce, 
1958) involved multiple iterations of data interpreta-
tion and going forth and back between data and re-
lated literature, ultimately enabling the dialogical rea-
soning and empirical corroboration of our findings. To 
ensure the close connection of our emergent expla-
nations with our data and empirical reality, we paid 
careful attention to the line-by-line coding of our data 
and the subsequent abstraction from that coding to 
identify structural entities, i.e., private and public 
logics, relationships between them, e.g., the competi-
tion between logics and related changes to referring 
entities over time, i.e., the co-evolution of private and 
public logics and process of convergence, thereby 
always taking into account the case study context, 
differences in the interpretations, and potential rival 
explanations in an iterative process of interpretations 
(principle #6) until we derived a consistent and plau-
sible story. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Principles of interpretive field research (Klein & Myers 1999) 
Principle (Klein & Myers 1999) How we Addressed the Principle 
#1 Hermeneu-
tic circle 
Suggests that all human rationaliza-
tion is done by reflecting iteratively on 
the relational, interdependent mean-
ing of single categories and the 
overall context of the different cate-
gories identified. 
We identified and abstracted from the underlying case categories and conceptualized their relations, e.g., by 
identifying phases and events, which has an impact on the transformation of sub-categories of the identified 
institutional logics and their interdependencies.  
 
#2  
Context-
ualization 
Critical reflection of the socio-
technical environmental and historical 
background of the research to allow 
readers to understand how the issues 
under investigation emerged. 
We identified three phases of different settings of institutional logics and were able to explicate the different 
dimensions of the identified logics as well as the relationships between them. We also analyzed the history 
and decision making process which predated the TollCollect project to consider certain potential path de-
pendencies which might be critical to understand the case.  
#3 
Interaction 
between 
researchers 
and subjects 
Self-critical assessment of own 
biases having an influence on the 
collection and construction of the 
gathered empirical data. 
We applied an open, exploratory research case since at the time we entered the case, so many different 
socio-technical issues existed that we decided to let the topics emerge from the data we collected. To make 
sure that we get as many perspectives as possible we interviewed participants from different hierarchy levels 
and stakeholder groups. In addition, we collected all public media feeds about TollCollect as complement 
source for data triangulation to protect our findings as good as possible from our biases and preconceptions.  
#4 
Abstraction 
and general-
ization 
Mapping of the research case specif-
ic empirical data through the applica-
tion of principles #1 and #2 to more 
abstract, theoretical concepts. 
In several discussions and iterations of different labels for the identified dimensions and institutional logics, 
as well as going back into the field gathering more interviews and additional data such as public media 
feeds, we went back and forth between the empirical data and the emerging constructs and their relations on 
the one hand and literature that might be suitable to explain the phenomena we observed on the other hand.  
#5 
Dialogical 
reasoning 
Applying a critical sense making 
process when comparing empirical 
findings with theoretical preconcep-
tions which guided the research and 
subsequently the findings. 
While the data at hand provides also alternative avenues for interpretation, such as discussing only phase 2 
from an escalation of commitment point of view where the new management team is sent in as firefighters to 
rescue the IT PPP or to discuss the dynamics over time only from an individual level, in the analysis process 
the data told us that the strongest and potentially most important contribution can be made by explaining the 
identified changes in institutional logics at the organizational level. Thus, after intense discussions, we de-
cided to elaborate and explain the balancing of logics as an intermediary step between coexistence and 
convergence of institutional logics as core contribution of our research. 
#6 
Multiple inter-
pretations 
Critical reflection of the different 
perceptions and interpretations of the 
interviewees of the events under 
study. 
In the analysis process of the case data we identified public side institutional norms and rules which we 
found to have an explanatory power to explain other behaviors and statements observed. However, before 
we identified institutional logics as lens to explain the relational rules underlying the IT PPP case, we also 
considered psychological contract theory and boundary spanning theory as alternative lenses. However, we 
settled on institutional logics theory as reference theory which allowed us to align the theorized linkages 
between the identified logics and trigger events. 
#7 
Suspicion 
Being aware of potential biases and 
inconsistent views and interpretations 
from the interviewees.  
While we predominantly relied on line-by-line coding and theoretical abstraction using ATLAS.ti software to 
analyze the interviews, we also conducted a content analysis of the newspaper coverage of TollCollect. 
Together with the meeting minutes, project documentations, and presentations we received from TollCollect 
we were able to critically triangulate different opinions, views and archival material to develop our insights. 
We were also able to discuss intermediate findings with TollCollect employees to substantiate our findings 
even further. The data analysis, the interviews and the theorizing was done always in a team of at least two 
investigators, while altogether three researchers worked on this research project who provided their views 
and causal analyses. 
 
An example of our coding is presented in Table 4. 
Over time, we identified institutional logics theory as 
the most appropriate theoretical lens that provided us 
with a ‘sensitizing device’ to aid the conceptualization 
and abstraction of our emerging findings. We identi-
fied the theme of competing institutional logics and 
their co-evolution over time, eventually leading to 
convergence, as offering the best available explana-
tion of our research phenomenon. While analyzing 
the gathered primary and secondary data, we contin-
uously discussed our findings and the potential bias-
es due to the different roles of the interviewees. Natu-
rally, the German ministry had an interest in justifying 
their position while the private industry partners also 
had their point of view. Applying the principle of sus-
picion can be seen as sort of starting point where we 
embarked into the literature of institutional logics, 
since the differences in the perceptions and expecta-
tions in the beginning of TollCollect and the subse-
quent disappearance of these differences in the ex-
planations of the interviewees guided us towards in-
stitutional logics and their changes (principle #7). Fi-
nally, we developed a model to illustrate how public 
and private parties established a partnership by ne-
gotiating a mode of collaboration. 
 
Table 4. Hermeneutics and coding example for public side institutional logic 
Selected open 
codes 
Selected quotes Meta-theoretical lens  
Category di-
mensions  
Resulting category 
- Politically 
motivated 
goals 
- Legal re-
strictions 
- Pressure of 
media and 
general public 
- “For a public client it is crucial to realize a 
technological solution which guarantees 
equal treatment for every user and accu-
racy.” 
- “Concerning the construction of the en-
forcement bridges it was necessary not 
only to negotiate these issues with the 
public client, but also with the authorities 
of the separate states.”  
- Organizational 
values and practices 
are legitimized 
based on the regula-
tive, normative and 
cultural-cognitive el-
ements of an institu-
tional environment 
(Scott, 2001) 
- Institutional logics 
provide the formal 
and informal rules 
that guide organiza-
tions during specify-
ing their pursued 
values and practices 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 
1999) 
Political goals 
Public-side institutional 
logic 
- IS planning 
with fixed de-
livery date 
- IS develop-
ment without 
leeway for 
compromises 
- Continuous 
adaptation of  
IS require-
ments 
- “The public client illustrated clearly that he 
was not willing to make compromises on 
initial requirements since this could lead 
to distortion of competition concerning the 
competitors from the tendering proce-
dure.” 
- “A standard economic practice is to de-
velop systems with 90% accuracy, which 
is not viable in political environments 
since this makes the procedure vulnerable 
for lawsuits.” 
Law-based 
practices 
 
Case Description 
After the German federal government signaled its 
interest in a toll collection system for heavy trucks in 
November 1998, public authorities announced the 
start of the tendering procedure in December 1999. 
In January 2001, eight commercial consortia in addi-
tion to TollCollect (consisting of Deutsche Telekom, 
DaimlerChrysler Financial Services, and Cofiroute) 
had noted interest and submitted proposals. Finally, 
in September 2002, the TollCollect consortium was 
assigned the project. Its aim was to develop and im-
plement the first satellite-based, country-wide toll col-
lecting system in the world (Doan 2010), using the 
global system for mobile communications (GSM) 
standard and satellite-based global positioning sys-
tems (GPS) (for more information, see 
www.tollcollect.de). The project was carried out in 
cooperation between public and private partners, who 
succeeded with project realization on January 1st, 
2005. The goal of the system was the detection of the 
use of toll roads by heavy trucks in Germany and the 
automatic charge, according to their emission class, 
weight, and number of axles. For trucks not using the 
automatic, satellite-based system, a manual, termi-
nal-based booking system was installed in 3,500 gas 
stations. The former solution should use an on-board 
unit (OBU) in each truck to collect traffic records and 
send mileage data to the central TollCollect account-
ing system, via GSM. The OBUs thus had to be built 
into trucks from Germany and other European coun-
tries, to allow a free flow of traffic even from trucks 
only transiting Germany. More than 600,000 OBUs 
were installed into European trucks with software that 
could be updated via GSM. Furthermore, 300 en-
forcement bridges had to be built and connected to a 
central control facility, equipped with cameras and 
scales embedded into the highway, to monitor the 
passing traffic visually, by weight, and in terms of the 
number of axles per truck. Any truck not logged into 
the TollCollect system prompted an automatic check 
against the German license plate registry (or other 
European registries) to identify the owner and send a 
ticket (for more information, see Rehring, 2006). 
Interplay, Balancing, and Convergence of 
Institutional Logics 
TollCollect went through several IT partnership phas-
es before the system was completed, as illustrated in 
Figure 1: (1) coexistence of divergent institutional 
logics, (2) balancing of divergent institutional logics, 
and (3) converging of public- and private-side institu-
tional logic into a new, joint logic. In the following sec-
tions we will discuss the phases illustrated in Figure 1 
and explain why the establishment of an IT PPP is so 
challenging and how it can be achieved by converg-
ing the partly incompatible logics into a new one. By 
re-analyzing the public media coverage (see appen-
dix), we were also able to identify the three phases 
where the quantity but even more important the con-
tent of the news coverage also sup-port our theorized 
model illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Public 
Institutional 
Logic
Private 
Institutional 
Logic
Public-
Private 
Institutional 
Logic
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Public 
Institutional 
Logic
Private 
Institutional 
Logic
Coexistence Balancing Convergence  
Figure 1. Convergence of public and private logic into a new dominant public-private logic in IT PPP 
 
Phase 1: Coexistence of Divergent Institutional 
Logics 
In this section we will illustrate how the two institu-
tional logics coexisted in the first phase of the coop-
eration. We especially will accentuate how the logics 
coexisted and how this prevented a serviceable part-
nership which eventually triggered the end of this 
phase. While providing examples where the two 
logics existed in parallel being incompatible to each 
other, we also abstract from the data and provide 
specific categories for the coexisting logics in the IT 
PPP, summarized in Table 5. The industry partners 
within the TollCollect consortium regarded the project 
as a possibility for entering the public sector and 
generating new business opportunities. These eco-
nomic goals constitute the essential norm of a private 
organization and accordingly influence their corre-
sponding behavior, because they are driven by the 
need to increase revenues and the value of their 
company for shareholders. A leading manager of the 
executing consortium described the initial attitude of 
the TollCollect management during the first project 
phase: 
The private-side management team was only 
focusing on the realization of new business 
opportunities instead of concentrating on the 
technical realization of this complex IT sys-
tem, since they estimated the project as a 
standard IT development project. 
Because this project aimed at developing a satellite-
based toll collecting system which has never been 
done to cover a whole country, public and private par-
ties had no prior experience with the technological 
project complexity (e.g., building an IT system with 
over 600,000 mobile clients that need to be connect-
ed and updated via GSM). Nevertheless, the public 
side assumed that private companies, generally ex-
perienced with telematics, automobile know-how, and 
toll collection, would be capable of realizing this pro-
ject without them being directly involved in daily busi-
ness. However, the private consortium was not used 
to developing IT systems that had to meet legal 
norms (e.g., principle of equal treatment of the toll 
collection law), which influence the political goals and 
their corresponding common practices. These public-
side goals and practices are oriented toward accurate 
compliance with legal norms and constitute the basis 
of a public-side institutional logic. Since private indus-
try was not familiar with public-side goals and prac-
tices at least initially in the project, they regarded 
TollCollect as yet another software development pro-
ject that could be managed with standard IT project 
management practices, such as presenting interme-
diate results in status meetings without consulting the 
public side to decide on development details jointly. 
By proceeding in a private project mode, driven by 
standard IT project management practices, and de-
veloping an IT system without involving the public 
side, the partners failed to recognize emerging prob-
lems on time and communicate them to private- or 
public-side top management. Instead, relying on pro-
ject experiences from their own working environment, 
the parties believed that everything was on track as 
the fixed delivery deadline approached. A leading 
manager from Deutsche Telekom, responsible for 
technical project realization, summarized the situation: 
It is not true that the risks of project realiza-
tion were not seen, but they were estimated 
like normal IT risks. This is a psychological 
problem. Since both sides were not aware of 
project realization difficulties due to differ-
ences about project requirements, they were 
not escalating the situation and believed that 
everything is on track. 
While the private partners were pursuing their com-
mon private-side practices, underestimating the tech-
nological challenges of the IT PPP project, public 
agencies were engrossed with public-side practices. 
Since the public party focused on the realization of 
the requirements from toll collection law, public au-
thorities had a specific optimization model in mind: To 
build a system that generated new revenues from toll 
payments (according to a balanced fiscal budget) and 
treat every transport company using toll roads equally. 
These political goals are the basis for the organiza-
tional behavior of a public agency. 
At first, private and public goals seemed to be aligned, 
but the underlying cooperation challenges and un-
derestimation of IT complexity prevented the IT PPP 
from dealing with the challenge of project realization 
adequately. For example, despite the approaching 
delivery deadline, public agencies kept modifying 
system requirements to comply with toll collection law, 
while insisting on an on-time project realization, pre-
defined by the same law.  
Changing project goals, in terms of additional project 
requirements, is not uncommon in any IT project. 
However, extending the delivery deadline and accept-
ing an increase in development costs to meet the 
specified requirements was not a viable option for the 
public agency, because public managers are bound 
to law-based requirements, which make it nearly im-
possible to renegotiate or compromise on time and 
cost criteria already determined during the tendering 
procedure. That is, changing any project require-
ments or postponing its delivery would threaten this 
already enacted piece of legislation, namely the toll 
collection law. The divergences of the underlying 
public- and private-side norms initially impeded rene-
gotiating or altering goals and practices, as explained 
by the independent system auditor: 
Since the toll collection law was already en-
acted and start of operations was determined 
for the August 31st, 2003, initially there was 
no leeway for compromises for the public 
party. Therefore, private industry was forced 
to deliver on time. 
In December 2002, despite the critical project status, 
the public partner insisted on a start of system opera-
tions by August 31st, 2003. The differences in goals 
and work practices between public and private part-
ners led to a first phase characterized by ongoing 
collisions of divergent public- and private-side institu-
tional logics, since the partners were initially not able 
to understand the ways of thinking and acting of each 
other. In addition to relational problems, issues in de-
veloping the OBU software and the construction of 
technically ambitious enforcement bridges made it 
nearly impossible to deliver the promised system on 
time. The private firms found themselves trapped in a 
dilemma: They had to accept any requirement 
changes and additional requests from public agen-
cies, but they still needed to deliver a full-fledged sys-
tem at the fixed delivery deadline. The resulting chal-
lenges for the private partners were not communicat-
ed clearly and early enough to the public side, since 
the private party still operated in their common pri-
vate project mode. Therefore, operational readiness 
was publicly announced by the private consortium in 
May 2003 to comply with public expectations and 
norms influenced by the toll collection law.  
Neither the public nor the private side initially realized 
the differences of their divergent logics and therefore 
did not adapt their different goals and practices. With 
the project being close to failure, since the private 
consortium was not able to deliver the IT solution on 
time, two options remained: Abandon the project, or 
develop a solution for project realization, which would 
require better mutual understanding and a mode of 
collaboration. Eventually, the recognition of project 
difficulties forced the partners to agree on a two-
month delivery extension, to November 2nd, 2003. 
With this agreement, both sides acknowledged for 
the first time that the original timeline was too ambi-
tious, as noted by an independent system auditor: 
For the first time in summer 2003, the difficult 
condition of the project became clear to the 
management which they had disavowed be-
fore. 
A system audit, checking for operational readiness by 
external auditors in July and August 2003, revealed 
that the system did not comply with all legal require-
ments of toll collection law. The audit triggered a per-
ception change on the side of both parties, which 
now realized that they had to reconsider their IT PPP 
relation. Developing this awareness enabled the suc-
cessful turnaround of the project, which triggered the 
transition to the second phase in our model: 
Trigger 1: The collision of divergent public- and pri-
vate-side logics, consisting of different goals and 
practices, and their consequences for successful IT 
PPP project realization triggered an awareness of 
public-private differences and need for collaboration 
change. 
Further quotes as well as the relation between the 
quotes, the related institutional goals and practices, 
and the institutional logic (public or private) can be 
found in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Phase I: Coexistence and collision of divergent institutional logics 
Logic Dimension Meaning  Example Quotes from the Case 
- Public side 
institutional 
logic 
Political goals - Focusing on reelection, imple-
menting regulatory policies to es-
tablish an image of being capable 
to “get things done” 
- ”Already in 2001, the minister of transport announced that the income of the 
toll will be used to start anti traffic holdup programs” 
- ”We calculated with 3 billion Euros for the national budget from TollCollect for 
2003” 
Law-based prac-
tices 
- Adhering to administrative rou-
tines, acts and laws in all activi-
ties 
- ”Due to procedural reasons we were not able to adjust our requirements” 
- ”Since the toll revenue was part of the budget act for 2003 a delay was not an 
option” 
- ”We know that the public procurement law is creating abstruse situations but 
what can we do?” 
- Private side 
institutional 
logic 
Economic goals - Focusing on resource efficiency 
and return on investment, cost-
sensitive 
- ”Management was focused to meet the requirements of the contract… but 
was not considering the whole business processes” 
IT project man-
agement practic-
es 
- Adhering to professional routines, 
frameworks, standards and train-
ings commonly used in IT pro-
jects 
- ”There was a lack of monitoring and controlling routines” 
- ”There was a lack of strategic project management” 
- ”Testing concepts (were) missing” 
- “I often was wondering why the launch of TollCollect was not managed like 
the launch of a new car model” 
 
Phase 2: Balancing of Divergent Institutional 
Logics 
In this phase we will provide evidence for the 
changed cooperation mode in the partnership, which 
became evident by changing perceptions and 
acknowledgement of the practices and goals of the 
partner as well as a balancing where new collabora-
tion practices emerged. Since both parties in the IT 
PPP regarded this as extremely helpful, they en-
gaged in intense discussions to balance out their dif-
ferent perspectives and practices which triggered the 
institutionalization of the new logic in phase 3. 
Shortly after receiving the results from the external 
systems review, the Minister of Transport and the 
leading managers of TollCollect held a crisis summit 
on October 5th, 2003. The participants agreed on a 
second deadline extension, without a fixed delivery 
date. To prevent project failure and establish a more 
sustainable partnership, the private parties acknowl-
edged public requirements and changed their former 
way of collaborating. The new partnership approach 
also included replacing the initial top management of 
TollCollect, which signaled the willingness of the pri-
vate side to adapt its initial goals and practices and to 
develop a collaborative approach for project realiza-
tion, as stated by a leading project manager from the 
public side: 
Facing project failure, mutual trust in achiev-
ing project success was deteriorated. How-
ever, our industry partners showed us that 
they were seriously interested in changing 
the current way of collaboration by replacing 
the management team as well as employees 
on the operative level to en-able a restart for 
this partnership. 
Although public and private parties started to reflect 
on the issues which emerged in the beginning of the 
cooperation and established a collaborative environ-
ment by the use of a fine-grained meeting system 
and continuous open communication (e.g., via private 
mobile phones in difficult situations, even overnight) 
to balance the different interests, the federal budget 
committee forced the Minister of Transport to issue 
an ultimatum for determining a mandatory schedule 
and solve disputed penalties (acting from a public-
side norm of legal conformity). The chief executive 
officers of Deutsche Telekom and DaimlerChrysler 
negotiated directly with the German chancellor and 
finally presented an amended project realization plan 
on February 29th, 2004. The rescheduled launch 
date for the basic toll collect system was now Janu-
ary 1st, 2005, but the agreement noted that the sys-
tem would not fulfill all the original requirements; re-
maining functionalities would be implemented in a 
second roll-out phase by January 1st, 2006.  
Realizing that the project was about to fail, the part-
ners started to acknowledge the trade-offs between 
economic interests and legal compliance. As a result, 
in this balancing phase, they started to balance their 
interests, expectations, as well as norms and practic-
es and tried to learn how the other party is approach-
ing the project. In jointly reflecting the situation they 
developed mutual understanding of their divergent 
goals and engaged in establishing joint IT project 
management practices, which constituted the pre-
conditions for balancing diver-gent institutional logics 
and the negotiation of a mode of collaboration. For 
example, the partners jointly developed the neces-
sary project requirements, explicitly incorporating le-
gal norms. The public side thus became more closely 
involved in daily project work from the private partner, 
which granted greater insights into project’s status 
and its development. They also learned about pri-
vate-side norms and practices in IT project manage-
ment through open, intensive communication and 
detailed explanations of the reasons for private-side 
goals and practices, such as their aim of generating 
new business opportunities. On the other hand, the 
public party recognized that they had to communicate 
more actively with its private partners to explain 
which parts of the system were critical for meeting 
legal requirements, such as the deployment of more 
enforcement bridges to ensure the principle of equal 
treatment. These insights on public-side norms initi-
ated the development of a more balanced, collabora-
tive logic, as confirmed by a leading manager of a 
federal agency, responsible for managing the TollCol-
lect project for the public partner: 
We realized very late how important a system 
freeze was and that project realization was 
impossible without it. This helped us under-
stand that we were forced to make compro-
mises about our project requirements. We 
needed to explain that some system re-
quirements however are mandatory accord-
ing to the principle of equality. 
Jointly developed collaboration practices and mutual 
understanding of public- and private-side goals and 
practices helped establish a sustainable PPP. Public 
and private partners used frequent meetings at all 
operational levels within the organization, but also 
with the public agencies in charge, to strengthen the 
beliefs of the different parties in project success and 
enable the partners to identify key challenges for 
solving this complex technical endeavor. This also 
improved transparency on project progress, as stated 
by a leading Deutsche Telekom manager for technical 
project realization: 
Discussing the problems and developing so-
lutions together in weekly meetings between 
the different parties encouraged all to com-
municate problems openly which resulted in 
transparent status reports and increasing be-
lief in project success. 
Such organizational structures and project transpar-
ency accelerated the balancing of expectations and 
establishment of a sustainable partnership. Managing 
the expectations and requirements of public agencies 
adequately, e.g., through joint system testing proce-
dures that included the partners and system auditors, 
helped ensure that the TollCollect system could be 
successfully designed and implemented. More details 
and quotes illustrating the balancing dynamics in 
phase 2 are provided in Table 6 where further exam-
ples are provided for the public and private logics at 
play but also how the balancing has led to a point 
where the emergence of a converging new logic was 
triggered, which will be discussed in more detail in 
phase 3.  
Understanding the different norms and practices that 
had been in conflict and establishing balanced IT pro-
ject management practices supported the negotiation 
of a mode of collaboration by balancing public- and 
private-side institutional logics. This finally enabled 
the turnaround of this failing IT project and triggered 
the transition to the third phase in our model: 
Trigger 2: Understanding public-private differences 
and establishing joint IT project management practic-
es enabled the negotiation of a mode of collaboration 
by balancing of public- and private-side institutional 
logics, as well as triggered IT PPP project turnaround. 
Phase 3: Convergence of Public- and Private-Side 
Institutional Logics 
While the balancing in phase 2 was important to de-
velop new practices and routines in a process of con-
stant discussions and alignment, the implementation 
and execution of the new practices triggered the insti-
tutionalization of the new joint PPP logic. In so doing, 
parts of the former disjunct logics converged and 
were organizationally set as the new modus operandi 
which led to the new joint institutional logic as base of 
the IT PPP.  
The change in the TollCollect management initiated a 
major shift in the way of collaboration between the 
participating parties and supported the balancing of 
joint goals and practices, which fostered the devel-
opment of a sustainable partnership. For example, 
developing partnership practices, such as new report 
structures, frequent meetings, and joint testing pro-
cedures, enhanced project transparency and hence 
facilitated partnership collaboration, according to a 
Deutsche Telekom manager, responsible for software 
development: 
The new management team that was in-
stalled in March 2004 was essentially bring-
ing new communication styles and reporting 
structure into the project. Before, everything 
had a temporary project-style character, not 
focusing on a long-term partnership. 
 
 Table 6. Phase II: Balancing of divergent institutional logics 
Logic Dimension Meaning  Example Quotes from the Case 
- Public side 
institutional 
logic 
Economic-
political practic-
es 
- Acknowledging necessary 
trade-offs between political and 
economic interests   
- ”The business process view was something colleagues on the public side were 
looking for” 
- ”We started prioritizing requests along the line of hard facts delivered from the 
private side within joint meetings ” 
- ”In the beginning, my people woke up in the night dreaming about parallelization of 
tests, clustering of tasks and so on and we understood rather late what it means to 
”freeze” a project, but now we understand” 
- Public-Private 
institutional 
logic  
Collaboration 
practices 
- Establishing joint IT manage-
ment routines thereby facilita-
tion cooperation 
- ”The new management possessed profound management and communication 
skills” 
- ”A joint end-to-end thinking was installed which was not apparent before” 
- ”We met on operational level with no higher management representatives and 
worked together how the test concepts should look like” 
- Private side 
institutional 
logic 
Political-
economic prac-
tices 
- Acknowledging the value of 
public norms and private IT 
management practices 
- ”While we focused on saving the project we late realized that for the public side it 
was the fight for political survival” 
- ”Delivering the revenue as stated in the national budget act was decisive for the 
outcome for the public side”. 
- ”We realized that in areas where law was prohibiting making any compromises that 
we had to trust our partners from the public side that they would find a solution.” 
- ”We had to adhere to the Federal Fiscal Code and we had no idea what that really 
meant for our project. Our partners from the federal office of transport guided us”  
 
After agreeing on a two-stage implementation plan, 
public and private partners started the convergence 
process between economic interests and legal com-
pliance. The private side abandoned its plans to im-
plement value-added services and concentrated on 
technical system realization; public agencies made 
concessions about how toll collection should be en-
forced, not insisting on a solution that controls all 
highways twenty-four hours on seven days a week. 
Decision makers on the public side took the risk that 
they might be responsible if the enforcement solution 
did not work properly and accidentally violates the 
principle of equal treatment. However, in contrast to 
the public norm-guided behavior in previous phases, 
the public side acted along the new, converged logic 
where also private-side norms and practices were 
integrated. Since taking risk on the public side was 
somewhat unprecedented, the new norms and prac-
tices were not completely undisputed; it particularly 
required defending public-side behavior during feder-
al committee meetings, as explained by a leading 
federal agency manager: 
I was asked during some committee meeting, 
why we were not controlling one hundred per 
cent of the traffic using the enforcement 
bridges twenty-four hours seven days a week, 
because then our amount of toll payments 
would be even higher. To disprove this esti-
mation we needed to calculate the amount of 
additional revenues in relation to increasing 
costs for con-trolling together with our indus-
try partners. Afterwards, it was clear that 
these additional expenses were not reasona-
ble. 
The partners continued to converge public law-based 
practices with private IT project management practic-
es by defining acceptable practices and norms which 
both parties could agree upon. For example, the pub-
lic partner dealt actively with the problem of integrat-
ing federal police squads responsible for en-forcing 
the highway tolls into the privately operated TollCol-
lect system. Further-more, the parties were able to 
improve their collaboration environment because 
several employees of TollCollect were specifically 
assigned to stay in close con-tact with the Federal 
Ministry of Transport, which further increased the 
transparency on project status. Moreover, TollCollect 
realized that open communication and consideration 
of all stakeholder groups (e.g., transport associations, 
public media), as well as further development of the 
partnership relation to a long-term, sustainable part-
nership based on mutuality and close cooperation, 
would be vital for successful project realization. The 
shift toward more openness and transparency ena-
bled changes in daily activities as well, according to a 
leading vendor manager of DaimlerChrysler: 
At that point, the stakeholders [from the pub-
lic side] were deeply involved in our daily 
meetings as well as project realization, which 
was a big advantage. During that phase, we 
intensively discussed apparent project risks 
for establishing project transparency. These 
changes increased the identification with the 
project and mutual trust between the partners. 
Once the public and private partners realized that 
they needed a collaborative approach based on close 
cooperation, they started to emphasize joint problem-
solving practices. While in the previous balancing 
phase expectations and norms from both sides were 
reflected and aligned; now a de facto realization of 
the balancing took place by implementing new rou-
tines and practices as confirmation of the converged 
logic. These joint practices further enhanced their 
partnership and helped establish the PPP. Finally, the 
involved managers became committed to the part-
nership, generating a feeling of responsibility and 
pride for their joint achievements, which also encour-
aged project realization. The feeling of responsibility 
and identification supported the establishment of a 
long-term partnership, which is a basic norm of a 
public working context rather than a private project-
oriented one and therefore reveals the active con-
verging of public- and private-side norms in this part-
nership approach. An independent system auditor 
detected this change in behavior: 
Even at night upcoming problems were im-
mediately reported to the public side, which 
prevented the public side from being first in-
formed of project difficulties by the media 
next morning. Before, the private partner had 
avoided to inform the public side in detail 
about upcoming project difficulties. 
Converging public- and private-side institutional 
logics meant that the partners were jointly able to 
address the technical project complexity. After multi-
ple user tests and reviews by system auditors, on 
April 21st, 2004, the first functional system tests suc-
ceeded. Test runs between June and August 2004 
eliminated remaining doubts about the feasibility of 
the system. Although the test runs were still produc-
ing system failures, the public partner was finally 
used to private-side practices (e.g., short-term worka-
rounds, patches to fix software problems) and had 
developed trust into the private partner. Therefore, 
upcoming problems did not directly lead to project 
status escalation, which was regarded as a positive 
sign of the successful establishment of a sustainable 
partnership based on mutual trust and understanding, 
as noted by one of the system auditors: 
Communicating test results to all stakehold-
ers on a regular base initiated a joint under-
standing of the problems and encouraged 
belief in a successful project turnaround. 
Though in that situation the reporting system 
sometimes made upcoming problems trans-
parent, the public side did not immediately 
escalate the situation. This supported the es-
tablishment and maintenance of a positive 
atmosphere within the partnership. 
On December 29th, 2004, the toll collecting system 
began operating without any technical issues. Suc-
cessful system implementation made prior resent-
ments fade away while a positive atmosphere of co-
operation took over. Mutual understanding and com-
promises on joint goals and practices were ultimately 
apparent in January 2005, according to a vendor 
manager of DaimlerChrysler, which finally underlined 
the successful establishment of the IT PPP: 
Shared understanding between the parties 
was driven by open communication and a 
joint motivation concerning project realization. 
Finally, political constraints concerning tech-
nical requirements were not carved in stone 
anymore. Both parties had realized that only 
mutual compromises would lead to success-
ful project realization. 
On January 19th, 2005, after two weeks of operation, 
the system was declared a success by the German 
chancellor. This positive view was repeated by vari-
ous political stakeholders and the media through April 
2005. In the aftermath, other countries signaled inter-
est in introducing a similar system. By all accounts 
and in spite of the enormous difficulties the project 
was confronted with in the beginning, the TollCollect 
system was finally considered an overall success.  
Further insights into the convergence of public and 
private side institutional logics in phase 3 are provid-
ed in Table 7 where further examples for the devel-
opment of joint practices are provided. 
Discussion & Conclusion 
The main contribution of this research is the confir-
mation of existing theories about the competition be-
tween different institutional logics where we were 
able to provide some explanations how two different 
logics with different organizational practices have 
been altered by balancing expectations, practices, 
and goals into a converged new logic to establish an 
IT PPP. 
Table 7. Phase III: Convergence of public- and private-side institutional logics 
Logic Dimension Meaning  Example Quotes from the Case 
- Public-Private 
institutional 
logic  
Institutional-
ization of joint 
practices 
- Organizationally 
implementing and es-
tablishing norms, 
practices, and rou-
tines which converge 
legal compliances 
with economic inter-
ests as well as legal 
requirements with 
professional IT man-
agement practices in 
a new IT PPP logic 
- ”The relation between TollCollect and the federal Government of Germany improved 
significantly and was characterized by constant consultations in a trusted atmosphere on 
all levels of cooperation.” 
- “On December 29th, the Federal Minister of Transport was the first person to draw a man-
ual toll ticket from one of the terminals. He did not need to do so and would have been 
blamed if the system had not worked properly two days later but he was supporting it, 
which illustrated the willingness to get the system up and running jointly.” 
- “If there weren’t a few central people on the public side who were willing to take risk to 
overcome their comprehensive-cover-attitude of a civil servant, we would not have been 
successful to jointly tackle all the bureaucratic problems.” 
- “Against all experts, and even against the advice of the German chancellor, the Federal 
Minister for Transport remained committed and was instrumental in developing a joint or-
ganizational culture.” 
- “Until today we have civil servants which we have sent to permanently work with TollCol-
lect to improve cooperation.” 
- “Working together allowed us for the first time to derive similar risk evaluations which 
helped us to develop decisions jointly, which initially was not planned this way.” 
- “While we jointly worked on solutions with intense communication and decision making, 
the project continued with patch windows and minor bug fixes which were decisively 
planned along tight schedules.” 
- “Every night we were sitting together to discuss the challenges and to openly discuss the 
risks, every goddamn night, but it worked.” 
 
We thereby did not only answer why the manage-
ment and enactment of IT PPP is so challenging and 
how it is done, we also were able to provide some 
explanatory insights to the literature on institutional 
logics. While prior literature on institutional logics al-
ready theorized that competing logics are rarely a 
stable situation where one logic dominates or re-
places the other one, there is only some research in 
the area of competing logics that elaborates on the 
convergence of logics to form a new, third logic. Here, 
we were able to disclose the mechanism of balancing 
different practices and goals in the balancing phase 
where it is explained how cooperations such as IT 
PPPs can convert situations of coexisting institutional 
logics into situations with converged, aligned institu-
tional logics. While in our case the balancing of logics 
in the second phase led to a convergence phase 
where a new logic was explicated and institutional-
ized, alternative subsequent phases of the balancing 
phase are imaginable, e.g., where one logic is domi-
nating the other or where an ongoing coexistence 
occurs. However, with IT PPPs which have a duration 
of up to 10 years or even longer and with the neces-
sity to exchange knowledge between the participants 
in order to succeed, convergence seems to be more 
plausible for this type of cooperation. In particular, we 
analyzed the IT PPP challenges which initially were 
created by public- and private-side norms and prac-
tices (e.g., conflicts between economic interests and 
legal compliance) which impeded public-private col-
laboration and the changes to overcome these chal-
lenges (e.g., by balancing IT management practices) 
to establish and maintain a sustainable partnership.  
Thus, this study contributes to the theoretical domain 
of competing institutional logics. In particular, we find 
first evidence for a rather extensive balancing phase 
which precedes the phase where the emerging con-
verging logic is institutionalized, thereby extending 
prior studies in this area (Currie & Guah, 2007; Ran-
dall & Munro, 2010; Sahay, et al., 2010). In contrast 
to these studies, we confirm and contribute to institu-
tional logics theory by explaining how the conver-
gence process unfolds in an inter-organizational set-
ting. Figure 2 illustrates the intermediary step of bal-
ancing before the two competing institutional logics 
can converge to form a new logic. 
In terms of abstraction and generalizability, we 
acknowledge that our results are specific to the IT 
PPP domain. Furthermore, because we retrospec-
tively investigated the establishment of a sustainable 
IT PPP, we needed to make sure that we gained in-
sights into these temporal aspects by interviewing 
participants of different hierarchy levels, affiliations, 
and partnership phases. Future research in this area 
might focus not only on the IT PPP itself but on the 
complete lifecycle from the very beginning of the co-
operation even before the IT PPP is established. 
Several organizational and technical problems in the 
TollCollect case reflected decisions which have been 
made even before the partnership was launched, for 
example. To extend our findings, further research 
should accompany an IT PPP over its complete 
course of action. In addition, it would be desirable to 
explore leadership behaviors and governance struc-
tures that best support IT PPP management. Finally, 
a cross-case analysis of different IT PPP could com-
pare differences and similarities due to different sizes 
and varying goals to substantiate our findings. 
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Figure 2. Convergence of public and private logic into a new dominant public-private logic
The interplay and competition between public- and 
private-side logics in the coexistence phase was 
characterized by a collision of these two that drove 
both organizations to enter the second phase where 
the different logics were balanced before a new con-
vergent collaboration logic was institutionalized in the 
third phase. That balancing process in phase two 
meant more than developing just joint goals and prac-
tices for effective cooperation. In particular, public- 
and private-side organizations had to realize that they 
needed to acknowledge that both logics made sense 
from their point of view and that their norms and prin-
ciples had to be adapted which required balancing 
and re-assessing some of their institutional logics. 
Both sides had to adapt to each other, which resulted 
in a convergence of public- and private-side institu-
tional logics in phase 3 where the new merged public-
private institutional logic was institutionalized and en-
forced which was key for the joint IT PPP. 
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Appendix. Public media coverage of TollCollect, 2002–2007 
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Septemer 20th,2002
TollCollect wins 
commercial tender
February 29th, 2004
TollCollect proposes 
new deal
March 15th, 2004
Restructuring of 
TollCollect
August 4th, 2006
Police wants to use toll 
data for means of 
tracing criminals
December 9th, 2006
TollCollect expects all-time 
record for colleceting toll 
August 5th, 2007
TollCollect file suits 
against federal 
government
End of July 2003
TollCollect announces 
new starting date 
(November 2003)
May 1st, 2003
TollCollect 
announces "ready-
to-operate" to the 
government
June 10th, 2002
Federal
government is 
willing to select 
TollCollect as 
provider
January 27th, 2004
TollCollect  
announces new
start date
October 5th, 2003
Announcement of 
delay with 
undefined starting 
date
January 2nd, 2007
Toll collecting 
shall be extended 
on country roads
October 14th, 2003
Managing director of 
TollCollect resigns
October 6th, 2007
Hungary and Slovakia 
signal their interest 
for the toll collecting 
system
Phase I:
coexistence
Phase II:
balancing
Phase II:
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